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I. INTRODUCTION
Should the law provide special protection for religion? Writing in the 
late 1960s, Milton Konvitz offered one answer to this question. He 
suggested that the framers of the First Amendment could have saved us
all some trouble if only they had included the word “conscience” 
alongside the free exercise of religion.1 Had they done so, the Supreme 
Court would not have needed to distort out of recognition a federal 
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statute to protect secular conscientious objectors in the Vietnam draft 
protest cases.2  More fundamentally, the First Amendment would not be 
read to privilege religious claims of conscience, implying that those with
nonreligious ethical and moral convictions are not worthy of the same 
constitutional protections.3 
Given the diversity of religious and philosophical perspectives that
have developed within our society, the inequality between religious and
nonreligious views implied by the constitutional text is morally indefensible.4 
Perhaps it made sense during the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights, at a time when claims of conscience were understood mainly
in religious terms, but it now seems regrettable that the framers singled 
out religion in the way that they did.5  In selecting the phrase “free 
exercise of religion” and by not also including “rights of conscience” or
“equal rights of conscience”—two options we know they considered6— 
the framers gave us a text that has limited the power and perhaps the
willingness of courts to protect claims of conscience not grounded in 
what are considered traditional religious sources. 
This view of the First Amendment, that it is unfortunately limited by 
the religious assumptions of an age since past, might now seem like
conventional wisdom within the legal academy.7  Steven Smith says it is
“more accurately . . . characterized as ho-hum.”8  Of course, not everyone is
persuaded that the framers were mistaken and that the First Amendment
2. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965). 
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216, 234–36 (1972) (suggesting,
in dicta, that beliefs that are “philosophical and personal rather than religious . . . [do] not
rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses”).
4. For various arguments to this effect, see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN, 
RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013);
JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
(2011); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (2007).
5. I do not think this point is anachronistic.  We can regret the limitations of the
framers’ decision while nevertheless understanding it to have been a remarkable and 
historically significant advance in protecting individual liberties. See Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1403 n.181 
(2012).
6. See  JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 78–89 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing drafting history of the 
First Amendment).
7. Though clearly not among the justices of the Supreme Court.  See Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (“[T]he
text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.”).
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leaves something to be desired.  Among those defying the “ho-hum” view,
some persist in defending the distinctiveness of religion on theological
grounds.9  Others advance secular arguments based on epistemic,
psychological, or metaphysical distinctions between religious and
nonreligious convictions.10  But these, too, are “shopworn” arguments.11 
Indeed, at this point in the debate, it seems unnecessary to rehearse the 
familiar responses to these justifications for singling out religion.12 
All of this raises the question: Is it possible to argue on nontheological 
grounds for providing religion with special treatment while simultaneously
conceding that religious views are not epistemically, psychologically, or
metaphysically distinct from secular ethical and moral convictions? 
Andrew Koppelman thinks that it is not only possible but also that the 
resulting view is more attractive than the leading alternatives.  In his 
recent and important book, Defending American Religious Neutrality, 
Koppelman argues that the American legal tradition of treating religion 
as a “good thing” is justified on the grounds that, when interpreted at a 
sufficiently high level of abstraction, religion serves as an indispensable
legal proxy for a plurality of important goods.13  His claim is not that
religion is epistemically or ontologically special, but rather that no other 
legal category can serve as an adequate doctrinal substitute for it, at least
9. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious 
Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013); Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Liberty of the 
Church: Source, Scope, and Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165 (2013); see also
Stanley Fish, Where’s the Beef?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037 (2014). 
10. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 
YALE L.J. 770, 792 (2013) (suggesting that the demands of religious conscience might be
“ontologically superior” to “personal conclusions about right and wrong”). 
11. Cf. Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an 
Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33, 48 (2013) (“On
the other side, however, there is more than a little influence of a shopworn Rawlsian
liberalism, the attractiveness and authority of which is more often assumed or asserted 
than established.”).
12. But just in case, see Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 1377–1403; see also 
Anthony Ellis, What Is Special About Religion?, 25 LAW & PHIL. 219 (2006); Frederick
Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious 
Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); and the sources cited in supra
note 4.




























    
  
   
 
not without sacrificing some of the goods that would otherwise be
protected.14 
In what follows, after briefly summarizing Koppelman’s position, I 
argue that his view is vulnerable to the charge that using religion as a 
legal proxy is unfair to those with comparable, but otherwise secular, 
ethical and moral convictions.  Koppelman has, of course, anticipated
this objection, but his responses are either ambivalent or insufficient to 
overcome it. The case for adopting religion as a proxy turns partly on 
arguments against other potential candidates.  In particular, Koppelman
rejects the freedom of conscience as a possible substitute.  But even if he
is right that its coverage is not fully extensive with the category of
religion,15 the law does not have to choose between them.  It can and 
should provide significant protections for both.
II. THE PROXY ARGUMENT 
The proxy argument for singling out religion holds that no other legal
concept can be used to protect the same range of goods and values that 
support protecting religion.  This argument begins with an objection to
standard justifications for giving religion special treatment.  Such
justifications are said to rest on two related mistakes.  First, they claim 
that some quality is fundamental to religious belief, and second, they
give a reason specific to that quality for why the state should protect 
religion. For example, a common justification for accommodating religion 
is that believers owe a duty to a transcendent moral authority (God, or 
14. See id. at 44–45; Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 74 (2013) [hereinafter Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized 
Specialness].
15. I do not mean to concede this claim.  According to Koppelman, as a substitute 
for the concept of religion, freedom of conscience would be underinclusive because it 
emphasizes duty-based claims and thus fails to explain some paradigm cases of religious
accommodation, including Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 827 (1990)
(rejecting exemption for sacramental use of peyote) and Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetary Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (rejecting religious accommodation to
protect sacred lands).  See Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, supra note 
14, at 75–77. But I am not persuaded by Koppelman’s discussion of these examples.
Moreover, a social or relational theory of conscience might be able to explain them.  See 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 839, 856, 868–69 (2005); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1576, 1578–79. For now, however, I bracket this line of
argument.  Even if the freedom of conscience is not an adequate substitute for religion, it
may and indeed ought to serve as a supplemental legal proxy. My aim here is only to
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some other deity or deities).16  Compliance with that authority’s demands
takes priority over any duties created by positive law.  Therefore, when
religious obligations conflict with positive duties, the state should so far 
as possible accommodate those who believe they are compelled to
follow them.  On this view, what is essential about religious belief is that 
it relates to divine authority, and the state should value that quality about 
religion either because of its intrinsic theological significance or perhaps
because of the psychological force it has for believers.17 
Although the divine command theory is only one example, the 
problems with it are indicative of the general difficulties faced by any 
theory that attempts to define religion according to some quality (or set
of qualities).  For all such theories, there are always counterexamples to 
defeat them.  To continue with divine command theory, it is significantly 
underinclusive.  It cannot account for nontheistic religions (for example, 
some forms of Buddhism), nor can it explain why the state ought to, and 
indeed often does, accommodate religious beliefs and practices that
implicate significant aspects of believers’ personal identities but which
are not, strictly speaking, matters of duty or obligation.18 
This objection can be generalized.19  Every attempt to define religion 
according to some fundamental quality (or set of qualities) will face the 
same type of criticism.  The lesson to draw from this, according to the 
proxy argument, is that we should abandon such strategies in favor of a 
fuzzier, messier, and ultimately more pluralistic approach to defining
religion and to explaining why the state should provide it with special 
treatment. 
The upshot is that, at least for legal purposes, the concept of religion 
should be interpreted with deliberate vagueness and at a fairly high level
of abstraction.20 There are no necessary and sufficient conditions that
distinguish between religious and nonreligious beliefs.  Instead of searching 
16. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is 
Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1611 (1997) 
(book review).
17. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations, and Why 
Religion Is Special (Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 24, 36–37 (2013); see also
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 319– 
20 (1996) (giving the psychological version of the argument). 
18. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 43–45, 139. 
19. See id. at 43–45. 


























for criteria to determine what counts as religious, the law should (and 
arguably does) adopt an analogical approach.21  There are paradigms of 
religion—easy cases, so to speak—and it is possible to make comparisons
and to extrapolate from those examples to others about which there is
less certainty.  Approaching the concept of religion in this way avoids as
much as possible the problem of discriminating among religions.  The 
law does not rely on criteria drawn from one religion or another, but 
rather allows for the concept to develop and expand as necessary to 
address new claimants as they arise.  On this view, as Koppelman has 
argued in a related context, the vagueness of the concept of religion “is a 
feature, not a bug.”22 
The same basic point applies with respect to the justification for 
accommodating religion. If there is no quality or set of qualities that
determines what counts as religious, then there can be no particular value 
or set of values specific to those qualities that will explain why protecting 
religion is important.  Instead, any given claim for protecting religion 
will appeal to different aspects of religion, which, in turn, will make 
relevant different values.23 Sometimes, the state ought to accommodate
religion because of its psychological urgency for believers; in other 
cases, the reason will have more to do with enabling people to explore 
their conceptions of the good, or perhaps avoid conflicts of conscience,
or find spiritual guidance, or cope with their mortality, and so on.24 
According to this pluralistic approach, religion is conceptually irreducible. 
No other legal category covers the same set of beliefs and practices.  And
for that reason, no other category is connected to the range of goods and
values associated with religion.  Thus, to the extent that the state aims to 
promote those goods and values, religion is an indispensible legal proxy.25 
As with all proxies, religion is both overinclusive and underinclusive. 
In some cases, religious believers may benefit from special protections 
even when no good or value is served by those protections.  And in other 
cases, the state may fail to protect some nonreligious beliefs and practices 
that instantiate one or more of the goods or values that justify protecting
21. For analogical approaches to the definition of religion, see George C. 
Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1529–30 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 762–66 (1984); Eduardo Peñalver, The 
Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 794, 814–16 (1997). 
22. Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 
21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 148 (2013). 
23. See Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, supra note 14, at 77. 
24. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 124 (describing numerous goods associated 
with religion).
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religion (for example, exercising autonomy, promoting moral integrity,
or avoiding psychological pain).  But according to the proxy argument,
since there is no category that is less overinclusive and underinclusive 
than religion, the state has sufficient reason to single it out for special
treatment.26 
III. THE PROXY’S UNFAIRNESS 
The main concern with the proxy argument is that singling out religion
will lead to significant and unjustifiable inequalities.  Consider an 
example from the health care context recently highlighted by Elizabeth
Sepper.27  A doctor working at a Catholic hospital is confronted with a 
patient who is miscarrying about half way through her pregnancy.
Following medical protocols and with the patient’s consent, the doctor 
recommends ending the pregnancy.  Although it is clear that the fetus 
cannot survive, the hospital relies on religious grounds to reject the 
doctor’s request to perform an abortion.28  To save the patient’s life, the
doctor performs the abortion anyway, but the hospital’s delay causes the
patient permanent injuries.  Following the incident, the doctor resigns.29 
Suppose that instead of resigning, the doctor in this example sues the 
hospital to enjoin it from taking any adverse employment action against 
her. When asked why she violated the hospital’s policy, the doctor says, 
“[The patient] was so sick she was in the intensive care unit for about 10 
days and very nearly died. . . . Her bleeding was so bad that the sclera,
the white of her eyes, were red, filled with blood.  And I said, ‘I just can’t
do this.  I can’t put myself behind this.’”30 Suppose further that when asked 
whether her decision to perform the abortion was religiously motivated, 
26. See id. at 78. 
27. My description of this example follows Sepper’s.  See Elizabeth Sepper,
Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1502–03 (2012).  For the underlying 
facts, see Lori R. Freedman et al., When There’s a Heartbeat: Miscarriage Management 
in Catholic-Owned Hospitals, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1774, 1777 (2008). 
28. Such conflicts between doctors and religiously affiliated hospitals are 
apparently quite widespread.  See Sepper, supra note 27, at 1502 (reporting that “[f]orty-
three percent of doctors have worked in a religiously affiliated institution” and that
“[o]ne in five . . . reports experiencing conflicts between religious restrictions and what 
they perceive to be their duties to their patients”); see also Debra B. Stulberg et al., 
Obstetrician-Gynecologists, Religious Institutions, and Conflicts Regarding Patient-
Care Policies, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 73 (2012).
29. Sepper, supra note 27, at 1502. 





























   
 
the doctor says something to the effect of: “I am not religious. I don’t
believe in God. What I believe is that a doctor’s most basic ethical
obligation is to provide necessary, life-saving care.  That is my duty, 
and I was absolutely required to perform it here.” 
Assuming that a doctor who refused to perform abortions on religious
grounds could seek a religious accommodation under Title VII, or
perhaps under a state or federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) (or under a pre-Smith interpretation of the First Amendment),
should the doctor in the example above be able to assert a legal right to 
freedom of conscience under such laws?31 
A proponent of the proxy argument might concede that there is no
first-order justification for distinguishing between the nonreligious doctor
who believes, as a matter of conscience, that she has a moral duty to 
perform a life-saving abortion under certain circumstances and a 
religious doctor who refuses to participate in such treatment.32  Unless 
there is some ontological, epistemic, or psychological difference between
the secular and religious claims here—some quality or set of qualities— 
that provides a reason to favor one over the other, a law that relies on 
31. This example might lack state action for purposes of raising a claim under 
RFRA or the First Amendment.  See Sepper, supra note 27, at 1515 n.51.  But a doctor 
fired for performing an abortion that she felt was morally compelled might claim 
religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires 
that employers “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or 
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (2012).  A religiously affiliated hospital might argue that allowing a doctor to
violate its restrictions on performing abortions is an undue hardship, or it might claim an
exemption for religious organizations under Section 702 of Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1 (2012); see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1987) (upholding Section 702 against 
an Establishment Clause challenge involving a religious nonprofit). But of course the 
issue of hardship, or the need to claim an exemption, only arises if the doctor can state a
claim under the statute, which requires determining whether her beliefs and practices 
count as “religious” in the first place. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 331–32. 
32. Of course, there may be first-order moral reasons to distinguish between
performing abortions—even when the fetus is not viable and when the life of the mother 
is seriously at risk—and refusing to perform them.  But those reasons are not at issue 
here. The only question is the threshold matter of whether a doctor’s claim of 
conscience receives greater protection because it is grounded in religious beliefs.  We
could formulate a different example in which one doctor refuses to perform abortions for 
traditional religious reasons and another refuses to perform them on the basis of a moral 
or philosophical objection.  As it happens, such examples may not arise, not because the 
proxy of religion is applied expansively but rather because the law in many jurisdictions
protects those who oppose performing abortions on the basis of either “religious beliefs 
or moral convictions.”  See Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 1408 (citation omitted); see 
also Sepper, supra note 27, at 1509–14 (discussing individual and institutional “conscience 
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religion as a proxy for special protection is underinclusive and, to that 
extent, unfair to those excluded. 
A. Expanding the Proxy 
One way to avoid this conclusion would be to argue that the
nonreligious doctor is more “religious” than she thinks.  If a doctor with 
traditional religious views has a claim under the First Amendment, or, 
what is more likely, under RFRA (or a similar state law) to avoid 
participating in providing abortions, then courts might extend the same 
protection to doctors who describe themselves as nonreligious but who 
nonetheless claim that they are compelled by conscience to perform
abortions in some cases.  After all, the lesson of the Vietnam draft
protest cases is that the legal definition of religion is sufficiently vague 
and capacious to include secular claims of conscience, at least when they
are functionally equivalent to their religious counterparts.33 
More specifically, if the proxy argument incorporates the approach 
adopted by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Welsh, then a claim is
“religious” for legal purposes if (1) it is based on “moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs about what is right and wrong,”34 and (2) those beliefs 
are “held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.”35  In  
explicating the latter condition, involving the level of intensity with
which a belief must be held, the plurality explained that sincere beliefs 
that are “purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless 
impose . . . a duty of conscience”36 have the same practical force as
religious beliefs. As the plurality put it, such beliefs “certainly occupy 
in the life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by God’ in 
traditionally religious persons.”37 
The Welsh plurality’s definition of religion effectively subsumes
secular, moral and ethical claims of conscience.  And to the extent the
proxy argument adopts this approach, it might significantly diminish the 
problem of unfairness with respect to singling out religion for special
33. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970); United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965). 

































accommodations.38  As I have argued elsewhere, expanding the definition
of religion to include otherwise secular, but nevertheless deeply held, 
ethical and moral beliefs is one strategy for reconciling laws that
privilege religion with the demands of political morality, which require 
giving equal treatment to those with comparable claims of conscience.39 
B. Limiting the Proxy 
Not all proponents of the proxy argument, however, are willing to 
expand the definition of religion to the full extent suggested by the 
plurality in Welsh.40  In particular, Koppelman seems to have some
ambivalence on this point.  On the one hand, he approves of the outcomes 
in Seeger and Welsh and of the plurality’s reasoning for them.41  By  
expanding the definition of religion to include claims that are “purely
ethical or moral,”42 provided they are held in the right sort of way, the
plurality showed the benefit of incorporating a fluid and amorphous 
legal proxy. But on the other hand, Koppelman attempts to contain the 
potentially radical implications of the holding in Welsh, which would
apply the logic of religious accommodations to a wide range of ethical
and moral beliefs that would not ordinarily be considered religious.
Koppelman suggests that Welsh is limited in two ways.  First, he 
argues that the plurality emphasized the presence of a source of value 
that extends beyond an objector’s personal or policy preferences.  A request
for accommodation must be grounded in an ethical or moral principle.43 
Second, Koppelman claims that “the inherent attractiveness of pacifism” 
played a role in the Court’s considerations.44  Not just any ethical or 
moral claim would do.  Pacifism has a long and recognizable history in
the United States, and the Justices could understand the moral force
38. But for some reservations about this claim, see Part IV.B, infra. 
39. Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 1414–21; see also Laycock, supra note 17, at 
336. 
40. Cf. Berg, supra note 17, at 25 (“We can extend such [distinctive] treatment to 
systems that share the same features [as religion] but have not traditionally been called
religious, but the extension should be limited . . . .”). 
41. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 142–43; Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, 
Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 242–43 (2009)
[hereinafter Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions];
Andrew Koppelman, The Story of Welsh v. United States: Elliott Welsh’s Two Religious 
Tests, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 293, 313 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew 
Koppelman eds., 2012) [hereinafter Koppelman, Story of Welsh] (arguing that an 
analogical approach to the definition of religion can make sense of the “puzzling results 
in Seeger and Welsh”).
42. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340. 
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behind the objectors’ claims, even if they did not share their views about
the ethics of military service. Had the objectors come forward with 
different claims, they might have met stronger resistance.  Koppelman
suggests that an objection to racial integration in public accommodations
based on sincerely held racist views would not have received the same 
treatment.45 
The problem for Koppelman is that neither of these limits works to 
contain the scope of the definition expressly articulated in Welsh. Many 
nonreligious objectors might be motivated by ethical and moral principles
that are not obviously reducible to their personal preferences.  The most 
well known examples involve military conscription, but as noted above, 
there are increasingly common conflicts among medical providers and
their religious employers. Moreover, if courts were seriously committed to
protecting ethical and moral claims of conscience,46 we might also
expect to see claims for “religious” exemptions brought by women who
oppose abortion regulations, or gays and lesbians who object to employment 
discrimination, or animal rights activists who refuse to use animals in 
education or testing, and so on.47  Of course, if for-profit corporations
are permitted to assert religious liberty claims, then secular “socially 
conscious” firms might challenge burdensome regulations, just as 
religiously affiliated companies have in recent years.48 
There is also no reason why those with otherwise nonreligious claims
of conscience should only be able to assert them in the context of military
conscription. The Welsh plurality stated no such limit on its inclusion of
strongly held ethical and moral beliefs within the definition of religion. 
And any such limit would be arbitrary.  To Koppelman’s example, even
the racist who asserts a sincere ethical basis for discrimination—as
45. Id. 
46. For more on this point, see Part IV.B infra. 
47. Cf. Grainger plc v. Nicholson, [2010] ICR 360, [26]–[27] (EAT) (holding that
moral claims stemming from belief in climate change were protected as a “philosophical
belief” under British law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of “religion
or belief”); R. v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, [2005] UKHL 15, 
[2005] 2 A.C. 246 (H.L.) [55] (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[P]acifism, vegetarianism and
total abstinence from alcohol are uncontroversial examples of beliefs which would fall 
within Article 9 [of the European Convention on Human Rights] (of course pacifism or
any comparable belief may be based on religious convictions, but equally it may be 
based on ethical convictions which are not religious . . . .”).
48. For examples of conscience-based claims in the corporate context, see Nelson, 
supra note 15, at 1567; ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: 



















    
  
 
   
    
   
  
 




   
oxymoronic as that might seem today—could qualify in principle.  Of 
course, that does not mean the government must allow exemptions from 
prohibitions on racial discrimination.  It clearly has a compelling interest
in rejecting them, at least with respect to public accommodations.  But 
that is true even when such claims are grounded in beliefs that are 
paradigmatically religious.49  There might be sincere religious racists,50 
and they could assert claims for exemptions on the basis of their beliefs,
even if the government has compelling reasons to override them.  If 
there are sincere racists whose beliefs are grounded in ethical, moral, or 
philosophical doctrines, their claims would not be any more successful
in court. But they might nevertheless satisfy the definition of religion in 
Welsh. Nothing in the plurality’s approach precludes that result. 
Perhaps Koppelman’s attempts to hedge the outcomes in the draft 
protest cases are driven by a deeper skepticism about protecting ethical 
or moral claims of conscience.  At times, Koppelman has argued that using 
conscience as a legal proxy instead of religion would be overinclusive 
because it would protect the equivalent of “welfare monsters.”51  In debates
about consequentialism, a welfare or “utility monster” is someone who
gains great utility from the marginal consumption of resources, thereby
imposing sacrifices on others who lose less utility than the monster gains.
The possibility of such monsters is said to embarrass utilitarian theories 
by illustrating the unfairness of distributing welfare on the basis of 
subjective preferences.52  Similarly, in the name of conscience, people may 
claim that they are morally obligated to engage in actions that impose 
unreasonable burdens on others.  In extreme cases, those following their 
consciences may feel compelled to do terrible or atrocious things—commit
“honor killings,”53 withhold necessary medical treatment from minors,54 
49. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579–80, 604 (1983)
(affirming denial of tax exempt status to a religious school with racist admissions policies). 
50. See William Saletan, From Bob Jones to Bobby Jindal, SLATE (Feb 14, 2014,
12:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2014/homosex
uality_religious_freedom_and_interracial_sex_is_bobby_jindal_the.html (noting that 
prior to dropping its policy against interracial dating in March 2000, Bob Jones University
had defended its position by claiming, among other things, that “[e]very effort man has 
made, or will make, to bring the world together in unity plays into the hand of Antichrist. . . .
Bob Jones University opposes one world, one church, one economy, one military, one 
race, and unisex.  God made racial differences as He made sexual differences”).
51. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 135; Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional 
Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, supra note 41, at 224, 237; Koppelman, Story of
Welsh, supra note 41, at 309.
52. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974). 
53. See Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 
supra note 41, at 222 n.27. 
54. See Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does 
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engage in various forms of racial and gender discrimination, and so on.55 
As a result, any account of legal exemptions based on respect for conscience
will be vulnerable to embarrassment by such claims.
The obvious problem with the “welfare monster” objection is that it 
applies with equal force to claims for religious accommodations.56  If  
using conscience as a legal proxy is overinclusive, the same will be true 
for religion, especially if we adopt an analogical approach to defining it.
Of course, Koppelman knows this, so it is somewhat puzzling why he raises 
the objection.  Moreover, as Koppelman has previously acknowledged, any
claims that impose unfair burdens on others can be limited, either by 
statute or by courts applying some form of balancing, including measuring
against compelling state interests.57  Of course, determining how that 
balancing should be conducted is a deep and difficult problem. Indeed, 
critics have argued that the impossibility of developing a principled 
approach to limiting religious exemptions is a reason to refuse them in
the first place.58  But if proponents of singling out religion are unmoved
by that objection, either because they have a theory about how balancing 
should work or perhaps because they think it is sufficient for legislatures 
and courts to muddle through such problems,59 then it is difficult to see
why legal protections for the freedom of conscience cannot defended in 
a similar fashion. 
IV. THE PROXY ARGUMENT RECONSIDERED 
Up to this point, we have been considering one way of avoiding the 
objection that the proxy argument is unfair to those with nonreligious 
ethical and moral views. Koppelman seems to accept the Welsh plurality’s
55. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1245, 1256–57 (1994) (giving additional examples). 
56. See id. at 1256 (arguing that “the demands that religions place on the faithful, 
and the demands that the faithful can in turn place on society . . . are potentially 
extravagant”).
57. See Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 
supra note 41, at 222 (“This difficulty can be accommodated by noting that the claim for 
accommodation is only presumptive and can be defeated by a strong enough state 
interest.”); Koppelman, Story of Welsh, supra note 41, at 310 (“Perhaps this could be 
rebutted by the idea that a compelling interest can trump conscience.”).
58. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 55, at 1258–60. 
59. See  KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 164 (“That balancing is a matter of





















strategy of expanding the definition of religion to include them.  Yet he
seems uncomfortable with its implications, even while realizing that
there is no obvious way to contain them. 
Suppose now that a proponent of the proxy argument rejects the 
strategy of expanding the definition of religion to include secular claims
of conscience. Would it still be possible to defend the singling out of 
religion against the charge of unfairness?  Here I want to consider more
directly the argument that because no concept can serve as a global 
substitute for religion, the state is justified in using religion as a proxy to 
promote a diversity of goods and values. 
To defend this proxy argument, Koppelman gives the example of 
licensing “safe drivers.”60  Because we cannot tell who is a safe driver, 
we use a driving test to make some determinations.  The test will be 
underinclusive, which means it will exclude some safe drivers. But that 
does not mean the test is unfair.  If no other test would do a better job at 
sorting drivers, then we have a sufficient basis for relying on the test as a
reasonably good proxy.
According to Koppelman, the same goes for using religion as a proxy.
As with safe drivers, we cannot make direct determinations about which
deeply held personal commitments warrant special protection.  Religion 
serves as a good, if imperfect, proxy for that purpose.  And if there is no
better proxy—none that would be less overinclusive and underinclusive 
—then that is reason enough to adopt it, even if there is some residual 
unfairness.61 
Although the point of Koppelman’s analogy is clear enough, it also 
suggests a number of problems with his argument. First, while driving 
involves important interests, we do not generally consider them to be 
matters of fundamental rights—except maybe in California.  For that 
reason, we might tolerate a driving test that errs on the side of excluding 
unsafe drivers, even at the cost of failing to include a considerable number
of safe drivers. But when proxies are used to determine the scope of 
basic rights and liberties, we are generally more suspicious of significant 
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. In various domains of
constitutional law, this suspiciousness is marked by courts’ use of
heightened review to determine whether there are, in fact, substantial or
compelling reasons for adopting particular legal classifications.  If it 
turns out that the fit between a proxy and the goals it serves is seriously
underinclusive, that is a reason to question the proxy’s validity.
60. Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, supra note 14, at 74, 77. 
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A further difficulty with the driving test analogy is that it does not 
account for the possibility of using supplemental proxies.62  Suppose a 
subset of safe drivers fails our standard driving test in a specific and
predictable way.  Knowing this, we might wonder whether a different 
test could be used to identify that subset with greater accuracy, even if a
second round of testing would not substitute completely for the first.  If 
this were possible, then drivers who failed the first test might reasonably
demand that the state offer them another opportunity to obtain their
licenses.
Similarly, even if religion is a reasonably good proxy for protecting a 
diversity of goods, it is not sufficient to establish that no other proxy can 
serve as a global substitute. To rebut the charge of unfairness, especially
given that we are dealing with matters of basic rights, it is also necessary
to show that there are no feasible supplemental proxies that could be 
used to diminish, or perhaps eliminate, instances of unequal treatment
resulting from the underinclusiveness of singling out religion. 
A. Religion and Conscience 
As I have previously argued63 and as others have observed,64 however,
a wide range of international, federal, and state laws provide ample 
precedent for the existence of supplemental classifications to protect
nonreligious ethical and moral views.  For example, at the international 
level, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly distinguishes 
between conscience and religion, protecting both in Article 18, which
62. In conversation, Koppelman has emphasized that “the point of the driver test 
analogy is not that only one proxy will work but rather that the use of proxies is 
unavoidable.”  Although the analogy might be used to advance a stronger claim in favor
of singling out only religion, Koppelman rejects that claim.  See Andrew Koppelman,
“Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1079.(2014).  As a result, his theory is compatible with the argument for 
supplemental proxies developed in the text above.  As between our views, then, remaining 
disagreements about singling out religion are likely to turn on the relative significance 
attributed to the proxy’s underinclusiveness and on whether there is an important class of 
religious exemptions that do not sound in conscience—and, if so, whether there are 
secular analogues.  On the latter point, see supra note 15. 
63. See Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 1408–09. 
64. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993, 994–95, 998–1002 (2010); Rodney K. Smith, Converting the
Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little “Conscience,” 1996 BYU L. 

























states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.”65  If this language does not seem sufficient to mark a
distinction between conscience and religion, the same article further 
provides that “this right includes freedom to change [one’s] religion or
belief, and freedom . . . to manifest [one’s] religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.”66  The use of the disjunctive in this
provision was not accidental.67  The Universal Declaration clearly 
contemplates protecting beliefs that are not religious.68  Furthermore, 
nearly identical language is used in Article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights69 and in Article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty that the United States 
signed and ratified in 1992.70 
In terms of domestic law, federal and state legislation often goes 
beyond the category of religion to protect nonreligious ethical and moral 
beliefs. For a recent example, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes 
an exemption from its minimum coverage provision—the “individual
mandate”—for members of a recognized “health care sharing ministry,” 
which the statute defines as a nonprofit organization whose members 
“share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical
expenses among members in accordance with those beliefs.”71  Similar 
language is used in federal legislation prohibiting public officials from 
requiring health care providers to perform or assist with abortions or 
sterilizations when doing so would violate their “religious beliefs or moral
convictions.”72  The federal government is also barred from requiring
employees to participate in the administration of the death penalty “if 
such participation is contrary to the moral or religious convictions of the 
65. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added). 
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See Malcolm D. Evans, Historical Analysis of Freedom of Religion or Belief
as a Technique for Resolving Religious Conflict, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 11 (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., 2004) (discussing the drafting the 
Universal Declaration and noting that “[b]y including ‘thought and conscience’
alongside religion, nontheistic patterns of thought and belief are included”). 
68. See NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, SECULAR BELIEFS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 178 (2d 
rev. ed. 2012) (“The term belief connotes the expression of spiritual or philosophical 
convictions that, while not necessarily organized as a religion, have an identifiable 
formal content.”).
69. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
70. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
71. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
72. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 § 401(b), Pub L No. 93-45, 87 Stat 95
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employee.”73  Numerous other federal and state statutes and regulations
involving foreign aid, counseling services, vaccinations, pharmacies,
organ donation, assisted suicide, and, of course, military service follow 
the same pattern of expressly protecting not only religious convictions but 
also ethical and moral beliefs, conscience, or some combination thereof.74 
Against the backdrop of all this international, federal, and state law, 
there is a sense in which the First Amendment feels somewhat antiquated. 
The problem is not that the constitutional text protects religious free 
exercise, but rather that it singles out religion while not explicitly providing 
protection for nonreligious ethical and moral beliefs, especially those 
that sound in conscience.  When so much modern legislation extends
protections in this way, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the 
limitations of our constitutional text, except perhaps as a reflection of the
historical period out of which it emerged.  It is telling, I think, that in 
addition to the international human rights documents mentioned above, 
many of the constitutions adopted by other nations over the last half 
century are not restricted in this way.75  In protecting the freedom of 
conscience and belief, as well as the freedom of religion, they recognize 
that democratic societies are now marked by a wider diversity of religious,
ethical, and philosophical views than in generations past. 
B. Addition, not Expansion 
In addressing concerns about fairness to nonreligious ethical and 
moral views, there are reasons to favor the modern trend of explicit legal 
recognition for such views over incorporating them within religion as a 
single legal proxy.  The strategy of expanding the definition of religion
is appealing, in part because of the Court’s precedents in Seeger and Welsh
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3597(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
74. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 1630.16(a) (2013) (“Any registrant whose acceptability 
for military service has been satisfactorily determined and who . . . has been found, by
reason of religious, ethical, or moral belief, to be conscientiously opposed to participation in
both combatant and noncombatant training and service in the Armed Forces shall be 
classified in Class 1–O.”). 
75. See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (protecting “freedom 
of conscience and religion”); GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I at art. 4 (Ger.) (“Freedom of 
faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall 
be inviolable.”); INDIA CONST. art. 25, § 1 (“[A]ll persons are equally entitled to freedom 






























and because the text of the First Amendment is fixed.  But although, like
Koppelman and others, I have argued previously that a definitional 
approach might be one way to reconcile the First Amendment with the 
demands of fairness and equality,76 increasingly I think the stickiness of 
conventional meanings and the reluctance of courts to go beyond them in
understanding the concept of religion raise significant practical difficulties 
for this approach. 
First, the fact that so many laws refer to conscience and to phrases like 
“religious beliefs or moral convictions” suggests that the distinction retains
significance in ordinary language.77  Justice Harlan made a similar point in
his concurring opinion in Welsh. In construing the statutory requirement,
under section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
that conscientious objection must be based on “religious training and 
belief,” the plurality defined “religious” to include secular ethical and
moral beliefs.78  Justice Harlan thought the word “religious” could not be 
read so expansively.  As he put it, “[t]hat it is difficult to plot the semantic 
penumbra of the word ‘religion’ does not render this term so plastic in 
meaning that the Court is entitled, as matter of statutory construction, to 
conclude that any asserted and strongly held belief satisfies its 
requirements.”79 
Justice Harlan’s semantic objection to using religion as a proxy to cover
purely ethical and moral beliefs leads to a second concern, namely, that 
courts will share his intuition and resist conflating the concept of religion 
with secular claims of conscience.  Recall Sepper’s example of the
doctor who violates hospital policy and performs an abortion to save a 
mother’s life.80  Would courts today recognize the doctor as having a
religious claim on the basis of her strongly held ethical and moral beliefs? 
Despite the holdings in Seeger and Welsh, the answer is far from clear.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s dictum in Yoder, which distinguished
between the religious convictions of the Amish and the “philosophical
and personal” beliefs of Henry David Thoreau,81 a number of federal 
76. See Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 1414–21. 
77. See, e.g., KENT  GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 146–47 
(2006) (arguing that the ordinary meaning of the concept of religion does not include 
atheism and agnosticism).
78. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343–44 (1970). 
79. Id. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
80. See Sepper, supra note 27, at 1502–03. 
81. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (“Thus, if the Amish asserted 
their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of 
his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious 
basis. Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such
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courts have interpreted the concept of religion more narrowly than the 
Supreme Court did in the draft cases and, on that basis, rejected claims
for accommodation under the First Amendment.82 
The draft cases may well have been the high-water mark for expanding 
the definition of religion to protect secular ethical and moral beliefs.  If 
there has been some retrenchment in the definition of religion, and if 
courts are unwilling to apply the concept as broadly as the Welsh plurality,
then singling out religion is a defective strategy.  Under those circumstances,
additional or supplemental proxies are necessary to prevent unequal
treatment for those with comparable nonreligious claims. 
V. CONCLUSION
My objections to the proxy argument, at least as Koppelman has 
developed it, have focused on singling out religion for special protection
and, more specifically, on legal accommodations and exemptions.  I 
have not said anything here about the implications of my argument for 
the disestablishment of religion.  My general view is that the state should 
extend the principle of disestablishment to cover comparable nonreligious
ethical and moral doctrines.  That view is less familiar and more controversial 
than expanding legal protections to include secular claims of conscience, 
but although it deserves more attention, I shall not attempt to address
objections to it here.83 
Milton Konvitz was on to something when he argued that the framers 
of the First Amendment should have included a provision protecting the 
freedom of conscience.  If anything, the argument for that conclusion has 
Justice Douglas argued that the Court’s dismissiveness with respect to Thoreau’s beliefs 
was inconsistent with its holdings in Seeger and Welsh. See id. at 247–49 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). But as Koppelman has noted, the majority said nothing in response. See
Koppelman, Story of Welsh, supra note 41, at 314 n.100. 
82. See, e.g., Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 571–72 (4th
Cir. 2013) (relying on dicta in Yoder to reject First Amendment and statutory free 
exercise claims of fortune teller); Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 
51–52 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting exemption from immunization for beliefs based on
“secular chiropractic ethics”); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 
1981) (rejecting special diet for member of MOVE organization); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 
F.2d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 1975) (distinguishing Seeger and Welsh as statutory cases and 
relying on Yoder to express doubt about whether plaintiff’s objection to military
instruction was “religious” under the First Amendment). 
83. For a start at this, see Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 1421–26.  See also Nelson 










only strengthened in recent years, not only because of changes in religious 
(or secular, as it were) demography or the intensification of culture war
politics (if that indeed is happening), but rather because it has become
increasingly clear over time that the arguments for singling out religion 
have failed to withstand criticism.  The weakness of those arguments,
along with sustained moral and philosophical challenges, is driving the 
sense among many that important aspects of our law with respect to religion 
have become outmoded. 
1104
